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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[MAY

stances interfering with the rights of visitation granted in the original decree. The trial
court granted the father's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the mother appealed. The court, deciding for the first time whether an allegation of such facts is a
sufficient allegation of change of circumstances to require a hearing on a petition to
modify the divorce decree, held that ".... the welfare of innocent children, victims of
a broken marriage, is too important and too sacred to be disposed of by a judgment on
the pleadings, unless it clearly appears from the face of the record that the petitioner
(mother) has no right to a modification of the divorce. Here the application alleges
facts showing at least an interference with, and perhaps a deprivation of the right of
visitation granted in the original decree. Those alleged facts show a change of condition
entitling appellant (mother) to a hearing on her application for modification."
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Saville v. Saville, 44 Wn2d 793, 271, P2d 432
(1954), concerned a wife's suit to annul a marriage upon grounds that she was induced
to enter it by the fraudulent misrepresentations of her husband. The Superior Court
of King County entered a decree of annulment upon the default of the husband, and the
prosecuting attorney pursuant to the authority vested in him by RCW 26.08.080, appealed to the Supreme Court. There was no question but that the wife was induced to
enter into the marriage through the fraud of the defendant. However, it was the
appellant's contention that whatever jurisdiction the court formerly had to annul voidable marriages was withdrawn by the divorce act of 1949, and that only void marriages
could now be annulled. The court refused to accept fully the argument of the appellant,
and expressed no opinion as to his broad thesis that it was the legislative intent that the
remedy of annulment no longer was to be available in cases where the marriage was
voidable. Rather, the court narrowed the decision to only those marriages described as
voidable by RCW 26.04.130 and for which the remedy of divorce is provided by RCW
26.08.020(1). As to these marriages the court held that annulment no longer is available and that divorce is now the exclusive remedy. However as to those marriages
which are voidable and are not included within RCW 26.08.020(1), such as marriages
prohibited by RCW 26.04.030, the remedy of annulment apparently will still be allowed.
For a comprehensive discussion of the ramifications of the Saville case and of the general problem of annulment of voidable marriages under the divorce act of 1949 see
Comment, Annulment Under the Washington Divorce Act of 1949, 30 WASH. L. Ray.
62 (1955).

EQUITY
Mandamus-Taxpayer's Capacity to Maintain Action Against State
Officers. In State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie' four taxpayers (relators)
commenced an action in the Superior Court seeking a writ of mandate
to compel the governor of the State and the individual commissioners,
etc., of thirteen state administrative agencies or departments (respondents) to return the offices, books, records, and functions from
Seattle, where they were located, to Olympia, the State Capitol. It was
alleged that the relators had addressed a written demand to the Attorney General of the state requiring him to act in the premises, and that
1 145 Wash. Dec. 74, 273 P.2d 464 (1954).

See also ConstitutionalLaw at page 92.
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that officer answered and declined in writing to initiate any such proceeding. The Superior Court issued an alternative writ of mandate,
in response to which the respondents demurred on the ground, among
others, that the relators had no capacity to sue. The demurrer was
overruled and respondents appealed. The Supreme Court held: "Since
prior to instituting the present mandamus proceeding they had demanded that the Attorney General take legal steps to cure the alleged
illegal actions on the part of respondents and since the Attorney
General had refused to act, relators are entitled to bring this action
and thus they have capacity to sue."'
The Washington court in an unbroken line of decisions from 1891
to 1938, a period of forty-seven years, has consistently enunciated and
followed the general rule that volunteer private citizens and taxpayers
have no capacity to maintain an action against state officers in matters
of public concern except upon a showing of a direct, substantial and
pecuniary injury separate and distinct from that suffered by the general
public.'
The reasoning behind the rule was set forth in the first Washington
case on the problem in language which has been quoted with approval
many times as follows:
As the fallacy of a proposition can best be shown by distorting it, we
may presume that if one of the departments of the state government can
be suspended at the instance of a private citizen who has nothing more
than a community interest in a matter which concerns the general public,
that every department in the state can be suspended at the same time, and
the whole machinery of the government stopped, and the very existence
of the state, so far as the exercise of its functions are concerned, destroyed.
Surely such a theory of practice is not in harmony with the genius of our
government, nor will authority sanction, or public policy permit, the
adoption of a rule which will authorize any number of volunteers who
may rightfully or wrongfully, interpret the laws different from the interpretation put upon them by the officers of the state, to paralyze for a time
every or any branch of the state government.5
2

1d. at 80, 273 P2d at 469.
a Jones v. Reed, State Auditor, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891) ; Birmingham v.
Cheetham, 19 Wash. 657, 54 Pac. 37 (1898); Tacoma v. Bridges, 25 Wash. 221, 65
Pac. 186 (1901); Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (1911); State ex rel.
Pierce County v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 685, 151 Pac. 108 (1915) ; State ex rel.
Hartley v. Clausen, 146 Wash. 588, 264 Pac. 403 (1928) ; State ex rel. Jueneman v.
Superior Curt, 157 Wash. 429, 289 Pac. 28 (1930); State ex rel. Clithero V.Schowalter, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, 159 Wash. 519, 293 Pac. 1000
(1930) ; State v. Gattavara, 182 Wash. 325, 47 P2d 18 (1935) ; Sasse v. King County,
196 Wash. 242, 82 P2d 536 (1938).
4Jones v. Reed, supra note 3.
aId. at 65. 27 Pac. at 1069.
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In the instant case the court, rejecting the broad rule stated above,
relied wholly upon the more recent Washington case of Reiter v. Wallgren where the court, after considering all of the previous cases on the
subject, said: "We never have held that, in a proper case where the
Attorney General refused to act to protect the public interest, a taxpayer could not do so," ' and laid down this rule:
In the absence of a statute governing suits by taxpayers, a demand upon
the proper public officer to take appropriate action is a condition precedent
to the maintenance of a taxpayer's action challenging the validity and
legality of what public officers are intending to do or have done, unless
facts are alleged which sufficiently show that the demand to bring the
suit would have been useless.8
It was held that Reiter was precluded from maintaining the action
because he had not made a demand.
It would seem that the Reiter case decided only that a taxpayer
does not have capacity to sue where he has not made a demand on the
Attorney General and that any discussion about a taxpayer's capacity
to sue where he has made a demand on the Attorney General (quoted
above) was dicta. Thus the Reiter case which determined the rights
of a taxpayer who has not made a demand would not seem to be authority for the instant case which determined the rights of a taxpayer
who has made a demand.
However, the court reasoned that for the court in the Reiter case to
determine whether a taxpayer could maintain an action against officials
involving a public matter without a direct interest it was first necessary
to determine whether any taxpayer, under any circumstances, had the
capacity to sue.
Thus, the Reiter rule, as interpreted by the instant case, would seem
to be that a taxpayer has capacity to sue subject to the limitation that
he must first make a demand on the Attorney General.
However, the language in the Reiter case does not say that in every
case where the Attorney General refuses to act a taxpayer may do so.
The conditions, if any, to which this new doctrine is subject must be
left to the determination of future cases.
Declaratory Judgment - Jurisdiction. In Manus v. Snohomish
County Justice Court District Committee' an action for a declaratory
628 Wn2d 872, 184 P2d 571 (1947).
7 Id. at 876, 184 P.2d at 573.
8 Ibid.
9

44 Wn.2d 893, 271 P.2d 707 (1954).

1955]

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954

judgment was brought against the Justice Court District Committee

to determine the constitutionality of a statute providing that a Justice
Court District Committee shall group precincts outside cities of more
than 5,000 population into justice court districts, that boards of county
commissioners shall establish such districts accordingly, and that the
justice of the peace for a district, which includes a city under 5,000
population, may be appointed as police judge of the city. The action
was brought by justices of the peace whose terms expired before the
effective date of the questioned statute. The opinion assumes without
discussion that, under the declaratory judgment acts, RCW 7.24, the
courts of this state have jurisdiction to decide this case.
The Washington court has many times held that under the declaratory judgments act there must be an actual, existing controversy
between the parties having opposing interests, which interests must be
direct and substantial, and involve an actual, as distinguished from a
a possible, potential, or contingent dispute, to meet the requirements
of justiciability."°
An example of the application of this rule may be found in Adams v.
City of Wala Walla" where a labor union instituted an action under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to secure a judgment determining the constitutionality of an ordinance restraining patrolling or
loitering in front of any business establishment in Walla Walla, and
alleged that the ordinance would interfere with strikes which might
be called to settle labor disputes. However, no strike or restraint by
the city of patrolling or loitering, pursuant to the ordinance in question,
was alleged, nor was any actual enforcement thereof, with respect to
the union, shown. The court, in holding that there was nothing alleged
but a remote, contingent peril to the union, stated, "We are compelled
to conclude that no justiciable issue has been presented to entitle
appellants to invoke the declaratory judgments act."' 2
Thus, inthe Adams case, since the application of the questioned law
was contingent upon the restraint of the union's patrolling or loitering,
there was no justiciable issue.
Similarly, in the instant case, since the application of the questioned
law was contingent upon the reelection of the incumbent justices, there
would also seem to be no justiciable issue.
In the Adams case, the court also held, "although the parties have
10 Conaway

v. Time Oil Company, 34 Wn2d 884, 210 P2d 1012 (1949).
"1196 Wash. 268, 82 P2d 584 (1938).
12 Id. at 271, 82 P2d 586.
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stipulated that appellants have a sufficient interest in the present litigation to enable them to maintain this action, parties cannot stipulate
that a justiciable controversy exists so as to clothe this court with
jurisdiction, when it does not, in fact, exist under the pleadings and
the record as made."'"
The question then arises, if the justices presented no justiciable issue
and the parties cannot by stipulation give the court authority to entertain jurisdiction, how, then, was jurisdiction invoked under the declaratory judgments act?
When the case was brought up on appeal the Justice Court District
Committee (appellants) assigned error upon a portion of the trial
court's Finding of Fact which states: ".... that the unconstitutional
acts of the legislature cited herein renders (sic) the plaintiffs [justices]
uncertain and insecure with respect to their rights, status and legal
relations."'
This assignment of error apparently goes to the jurisdiction of the
court since it would seem that since the justices are no more than
potential candidates their interests are too remote for the justices to
be insecure with respect to them and, therefore, they should not be
able to invoke the declaratory judgment.
However, this assignment of error was not argued and though the
parties cannot stipulate jurisdiction, it would appear that the court is
permitting them to accomplish the same result by failure to argue an
assignment of error. 5
RIcHARDI)

.

BONESTEEL

Interpleader-To Try Title to Corporate Offices. State Bank of Wilbur v. Wilbur
Mission, 44 Wn2d 80, 265 P.2d 821 (1954), was an interpleader action by a bank to
determine title to church funds deposited with the clerk of the court. The appellant contended that the only way to try title to a corporate office is an action in quo warranto.
The court held: (1) Equitable relief (interpleader) may be allowed because quo
warranto is not an adequate remedy at law because the plaintiff (Bank) does not claim

an interest in the corporate office to invoke quo warranto and can only invoke it at the
discretion of the Prosecuting Attorney or of the court. (2) Quo warranto is not under
all circumstances an exclusive remedy and the title to such office may be tried in any
action where necessary to the determination of other matters in controversy. See also

Corporationsat page 111.
Equity-Declaratory Judgment-Demurrer to the Pleadings. Richardson v. Danson, 44 Wn.2d 760, 270 P.2d 802 (1954), was a complaint brought by the decedent's
heirs at law which prayed for a judgment declaring the rights of the parties under the
13 Ibid.
14 Note

9 supra, at 899, 271 P.2d at 711.

15 See the dissent in the principal case by Mr. Justice Olson.
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will and for the determination of the validity of the provisions therein with respect to
real estate. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiffs refused
to plead further, judgment of dismissal was entered, and plaintiffs appealed. The court
held, as a matter of first impression in this state, that when a complaint is filed for a
declaratory judgment and the plaintiffs set forth facts showing the existence of an
actual controversy relating to the matter covered by the declaratory judgment act
(RCW 724.020), although not showing that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration
of rights in accordance with their theory, a demurrer to the pleadings should be overruled. See also Property at page 178.

EVIDENCE
Hearsay-An Exception to the Rule. The importance in a civil
action of the criminal record of a party or the deceased in a wrongful
death action was further enhanced by the decision in Fleming v.
Seattle.' Last year the court in Minch v. Local Union No. 370, I.U.O.E.!
went beyond the general rule that the record of conviction could be
used to impeach the witness.3 There it held that the fact of conviction,
when material without regard to the facts upon which the conviction
was based, was admissible as to the amount of damages a plaintiff
could recover for lost wages. In order to obtain employment, which
was essentially limited to federal projects in that area, the plaintiff
would have probably needed a security clearance from the F.B.I.
In the Fleming case, the defendant sought to show habitual drunkenness as affecting the earning power and life expectancy of the decedent
in a wrongful death action. An offer of the record of a justice court
showing eleven convictions for drunkenness, mainly on pleas of guilty,
was not accepted by the trial court which sustained an objection that
this was hearsay evidence. The defendant took exception. The jury
rendered a verdict for $55,580 which the trial judge reduced, with the
consent of the plaintiff, to $37,580. The decedent was 62 years old,
had been advised by his physician to "take it easy" because of poor
health, and had not been gainfully employed for several years. The
decedent's wife had been supporting him and their three minor sons.
While the majority opinion did not so state, Justice Olson in his dissent indicates that the judgment was considered excessive. This
excessiveness would induce the court to find an error, as to the damage
question, to be prejudicial.
Thus, a dilemma faced the court. It could follow what it conceded
1145 Wash. Dec. 447, 275 P.2d 904 (1954).
2 44 Wn.2d 15, 265 P2d 286 (1953) ; noted, 29 WAsr. L. REv. 123 (1954).
0 1 Wi uoRE, EvmixcE 980 (3d ed. 1940).

